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Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
Re: State v. Brown, Case No. 20080435 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Appellant Armand 
Brown notifies the Utah Court of Appeals of the following pertinent and significant 
authority recently issued: State v. HarvelL 2009 UT App 271, — P.3d - (September 24, 
2009) (attached hereto). 
The Court's decision in Harvell supports that restitution may be awarded only if 
the record supports that the defendant's criminal activity caused the damages at issue. 
This Court stated: 
To resolve this appeal, we must decide whether Victim's pecuniary damages arose 
from Harvell's criminal activity. Utah has adopted a modified "but for" test for 
making this determination. See State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). A modified "but for" test requires (1) that the damages "'would not 
have occurred but for the conduct underlying the [defendant's] . . . conviction'" 
and (2) that the "'causal nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss . . . not 
[be] too attenuated (either factually or temporally).'" IcL at 544 n. 5 (quoting 
United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 590 (1st Cir. 1997)). With respect to the 
replacement of the brake system and the damage to the iPod, the State has not met 
this burden. 
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HarvelL 2009 UT App 271, f 12 (ellipsis in original). 
Harvell pertains to Mr. Brown's argument on appeal that the record fails to support 
a causal connection between the amounts in restitution awarded for rent costs, and Mr. 
Brown's criminal activity. Based on HarvelL the restitution award should be reversed. 
(See Brief of Appellant, dated November 3, 2008, Argument, Point II.A. and II.B., pages 
10-21; Reply Brief of Appellant, dated July 16, 2009, Argument A. and B., pages 2-14; 
oral argument, dated September 22, 2009). 
Respectfully yours, 
Linda M. Jones 
Attorney 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, LINDA M. JONES, hereby certify that I have caused an original and 7 copies of 
the foregoing to be hand-delivered to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450 South State Street, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, and 4 copies to the Utah Attorney General's Office, Heber M. 
Wells Building, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor, P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84114-0854, this V \ day of September, 2009. 
LINDA M. JONES / 
Delivered this day of September, 2009. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
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State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Corey Edward Harvell, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
OPINION 
(For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20070967-CA 
F I L E D 
( S e p t e m b e r 2 4 , 20 09) 
2009 UT App 271 
Third District, Salt Lake Department, 071901648 
The Honorable Judith S. Atherton 
Attorneys: Debra M. Nelson and Heather A. Brereton, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Kenneth A. Bronston, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Orme, and McHugh. 
McHUGH, Judge: 
ll Corey Edward Harvell was convicted of attempted theft by 
receiving stolen property--an automobile. As part of his 
sentence, Harvell was ordered to pay restitution to the victim in 
the amount of $763.24. We reverse the trial court's restitution 
order and remand to the trial court to reduce the amount of 
restitution to $94.95. 
BACKGROUND 
H2 In February 2007, Victim left her car at the residence of 
Friend while she was vacationing in Italy. When she left the 
vehicle, Victim locked the doors and gave the keys to Friend. 
Victim reported that the car "was running fine" at that time. 
Five days later, Friend's house was broken into and Victim's car 
was stolen. Friend reported the stolen vehicle to the police. 
H3 The following day, Witness saw a vehicle, which was the same 
color and model as Victim's, parked in front of his house. As he 
approached, Witness encountered Harvell, who was exiting the 
house. Noticing that a window was open in the house, Witness 
recorded the vehicle's license plate number before Harvell left 
the scene. Witness then entered his residence, where he 
discovered that it had been ransacked and a new flat screen 
television and a carton of cigarettes had been stolen. He called 
the police and reported the incident. 
f4 Sometime later that day, a man, walking his dog near an 
apartment complex, found a box of checks with Witness's name and 
telephone number on them. The man called the phone number on the 
checks and reached Witness, who notified the police. When the 
police responded to the apartment complex where the checks were 
found, they located the stolen vehicle. The officers spoke with 
the tenant of the apartment who used the parking stall where the 
car was found. Although the tenant initially denied knowing 
anything about the vehicle, she eventually allowed the officers 
to search her apartment. The police located Harvell in the 
bedroom, took him into custody, and impounded the vehicle. 
%5 Because Victim had not yet returned when the car was 
recovered, Friend and another friend of Victim's (collectively, 
Friends) retrieved the car from the impound lot. One week later, 
Victim returned and inspected her vehicle. She "immediately 
noticed the alignment [of the vehicle] was off, [her iPod nano] 
was broken . . . , and the gas tank was empty." After driving 
the vehicle for one week, Victim "noticed a screeching noise by 
[the] front passenger side tire" when she pressed the brakes. 
Victim delayed having the vehicle repaired until April 2007, at 
which time the vehicle was "almost impossible to drive" and both 
brakes, the calipers, and the rotors (collectively, the brake 
system) had to be replaced. 
%6 Harvell was charged by Information on March 6, 2007, with 
one count of burglary, one count of theft by receiving stolen 
property, and one count of theft. Harvell pleaded guilty to 
attempted burglary and attempted theft by receiving stolen 
property--the vehicle. In addition to receiving two concurrent, 
indeterminate prison sentences of not more than five years, 
Harvell was ordered to pay $763.24 in restitution to Victim to 
cover the cost of the brake system repair and alignment--$53 9.24 ,* 
a tank of gasoline--$25.00j1 and the broken iPod--$199.00.2 
1. Harvell did not appeal the trial court's order to reimburse 
Victim for the tank of gasoline, and we do not consider it 
further. 
2. Harvell was also ordered to pay restitution in connection 
with the attempted burglary plea. That restitution order was not 
challenged on appeal. 
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ISSUE AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
f7 Harvell challenges the trial court's restitution order, 
claiming it was improper for the trial court to order him to pay 
restitution for the replacement of the iPod and the brake system 
repairs.3 
[An appellate court] will not disturb a trial 
court's order of restitution unless the trial 
court exceeds the authority prescribed by law 
or abuses its discretion. Furthermore, 
[w]hether a restitution [award] is proper y 
. . . depends solely upon interpretation of 
the governing statute, and the trial court's 
interpretation of a statute presents a 
question of law, which [this court] review [s] 
for correctness. 
State v. Miller, 2007 UT App 332, \ 6, 170 P.3d 1141 (second and 
third alterations and omission in original) (citation and 
internal quotation marks omitted).4 
ANALYSIS 
f8 Utah law allows a trial court to order restitution " [w]hen a 
defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages . . . or for conduct for which the defendant 
has agreed to make restitution as part of a plea disposition." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (2008); accord Utah Code Ann. 
3. The brake system repairs cost $469.29, and the cost of the 
realignment was $69.95. Although Harvell challenged the 
realignment expense at oral argument, he did not address that 
expense before the trial court, and we do not consider it. See 
Pratt v. Nelson, 2007 UT 41, \ 15, 164 P.3d 366 ("[T]o preserve 
an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to the trial 
court in such a way that the trial court has an opportunity to 
rule on that issue." (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
4. Harvell also claims that the restitution order violates his 
due process rights. Because we resolve Harvell's appeal in his 
favor on other grounds, we need not consider the constitutional 
argument. See West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 999, 1004 
(Utah 1994) ("[C]ourts should avoid reaching constitutional 
issues if the case can be decided on other grounds."). 
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§ 76-3-201 (4) (a) (2008).5 "'Criminal activit[y] ! means any 
offense of which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal 
conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the 
sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the 
criminal conduct." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-102(2) (2008). 
Pecuniary damages are 
all demonstrable economic injur [ies], whether 
or not yet incurred, which a person could 
recover in a civil action arising out of the 
facts or events constituting the defendant's 
criminal activities and includes the fair 
market value of property taken, destroyed, 
broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses, 
including lost earnings and medical expenses, 
but excludes punitive or exemplary damage and 
pain and suffering. 
Id. § 77-38a-102(6). 
f9 We have previously nocea, "[h]owever, [that] a defendant 
cannot be ordered to pay restitution for criminal activities for 
which the defendant did not admit responsibility, was not 
convicted, or did not agree to pay restitution." State v. Hight, 
2008 UT App 118, % 3, 182 P.3d 922 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Thus, unless the defendant agrees to pay restitution, 
"the statute requires that responsibility for the criminal 
conduct be firmly established, much like a guilty plea, before 
the court can order restitution." State v. Watson, 1999 UT App 
273, % 5, 987 P.2d 1289 (per curiam). 
/ KlO Harvell argues that under the plain language of the statute 
he cannot be ordered to make restitution for the brake system 
repairs or the broken iPod because he neither pleaded guilty to 
stealing the vehicle nor agreed to pay restitution for damages 
resulting from the theft of the vehicle. Accordingly, he argues, 
the trial court improperly ordered restitution for pecuniary 
damages that did not result from his attempted theft by receipt 
of the stolen vehicle. To support his argument, Harvell relies 
on State v. Mast, 2001 UT App 402, 40 P.3d 1143, where we 
reversed a trial court's order of restitution for all damages 
resulting from a burglary when the defendant pleaded guilty only 
to receiving certain items of the stolen property, see id. % 18. 
5. As a convenience to the reader, we cite to the current Utah 
Code because the relevant sections are unchanged from the version 
in effect at the time of Harvell's crimes. 
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111 In response, the State contends that Harvell is responsible 
for all damages resulting from his conversion of the vehicle and 
the iPod. In making this contention, the State relies upon State 
v. Hight, 2008 UT App 118, 182 P.3d 922. There, we upheld a 
restitution order that compensated the victim for missing items 
when the defendant confessed to committing a burglary but did not 
admit to stealing those particular items. See id. *h% 4-5. At 
the restitution hearing, the homeowner testified that he 
immediately discovered these items missing upon inspecting the 
damage resulting from the burglary, and the defendant presented 
no evidence to rebut that testimony. See id. % 6. In affirming, 
we held that the trial court did not exceed its authority or 
discretion in ordering restitution for the missing items where 
the defendant's liability for the initial crime of burglary was 
established. See id. H 5-6. 
112 To resolve this appeal, we must decide whether Victim's 
pecuniary damages arose from Harvell's criminal activity. Utah 
has adopted a modified "but for" test for making this 
determination. See State v. McBride, 940 P.2d 539, 544 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1997). A modified "but for" test requires (1) that the 
damages "'would not have occurred but for the conduct underlying 
the [defendant's] . . . conviction'" and (2) that the "'causal 
nexus between the [criminal] conduct and the loss . . . not [be] 
too attenuated (either factually or temporally).'" Id. at 544 
n.5 (quoting United States v. Vaknin, 112 F.3d 579, 590 (1st Cir. 
1997)). With respect to the replacement of the brake system and 
the damage to the iPod, the State has not met this burden. 
1(13 Victim noticed that the car was out of alignment 
immediately, but the screeching did not occur until a week 
later.6 In addition, despite the screeching noise, Victim 
continued to drive the car for two months before she had it 
serviced. Although the record reflects that the brake system was 
replaced, there is nothing in the record to support the 
conclusion that the failure of the brake system was caused by 
Harvell's brief episode of reckless driving.7 Under these 
6. It is unclear from the record whether and how much Friends 
drove the vehicle, other than moving it from the police impound 
lot. 
7. The State provided the court with Victim's written statement 
that she was "told [her] car was finally recovered when someone 
reported seeing it being driven recklessly." While admitting 
that "the rules of evidence do not apply to a restitution 
hearing," see State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, % 16, 61 P.3d 1000, 
(continued...) 
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circumstances, we conclude that the replacement of the brake 
system was too attenuated both factually and temporally to 
justify an award of restitution. See icL_ at 544 n.5.8 
1l4 We also agree with Harvell that the State failed to make a 
causal connection between the broken iPod and Harvell's attempted 
theft by receipt of the stolen vehicle. See generally State v. 
Robinson, 860 P.2d 979, 983 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) ("Restitution 
should be ordered only in cases where liability is clear as a 
matter of law and where commission of the crime clearly 
establishes causality of the injury or damages."). The evidence 
demonstrated that at least two other persons--Friends--had access 
to the vehicle and the iPod. Further, there is nothing in 
Harvell's statement or the evidence presented at the restitution 
hearing that establishes Harvell ever used the iPod or even knew 
it was in the vehicle. In the absence of any evidence linking 
Harvell to the iPod, the nexus between Harvell's possession of 
the vehicle and the iPod discovered broken one week later is 
simply too attenuated to establish that but for Harvell's 
attempted theft, Victim would not have incurred these damages. 
CONCLUSION 
1l5 Accordingly, we conclude that the restitution order, with 
respect to the brake system repairs and iPod replacement, is 
contrary to the plain language of the restitution and sentencing 
statutes and must be reversed. See generally Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-201(4)(a) (2008) (allowing trial court to order 
restitution where criminal activity resulted in pecuniary 
damages); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(1) (2008) (same); State v. 
Mast, 2001 UT App 402, % 18, 40 P.3d 1143 (reversing restitution 
7. (...continued) 
Harvell contends that this evidence was too unreliable to support 
an award of restitution. We need not resolve this issue because, 
even accepting that Harvell drove recklessly, there is 
insufficient evidence of causation to support the restitution 
award for the costs of the iPod replacement and the brake system 
repairs. f 
I 
8. We also reject the State's argument that, as in State v. 
Hight, 2008 UT App 118, % 6, 182 P.3d 922, Harvell presented no 
evidence to challenge the trial court's inclusion of costs to 
repair the brake system in the restitution order. Here, the 
State did not support any causal connection between the failure 
of the car's brake system and Harvell's admitted crime. Thus, 
there was nothing to rebut. 
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order for all damages resulting from burglary where the defendant 
admitted only to receiving certain stolen property because it 
"violate[d] the plain language of the statute"). We remand to 
the trial court for entry of a restitution order consistent with 
these proceedings. 
Carolyn B. McHugh, Judge 
Hi6 WE CONCUR: 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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